USTR大使就中美貿(mào)易關(guān)系新方針的講話

關(guān)務(wù)小二

Remarks As Prepared for Delivery of Ambassador Katherine Tai Outlining the Biden-Harris Administration’s “New Approach to the U.S.-China Trade Relationship”
凱瑟琳-戴大使概述拜登-哈里斯政府 "美中貿(mào)易關(guān)系新方針 "的講話October 04, 2021
2021年10月4日

(編注：以下中文內(nèi)容為粗略翻譯，僅供參考，詳情請見原文)
WASHINGTON – United States Trade Representative Katherine Tai today delivered remarks at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) outlining the Biden-Harris Administration’s new approach to the U.S.-China bilateral trade relationship.
美國貿(mào)易代表戴耀廷今天在國際戰(zhàn)略研究中心發(fā)表講話，概述了拜登-哈里斯政府處理美中雙邊貿(mào)易關(guān)系的新方法。

You can watch the remarks live at www.csis.org/events/conversation ... ade-representative.
Ambassador Tai’s remarks as prepared for delivery are below:
你可以在www.csis.org/events/conversation ... rade-representative，觀看講話的實(shí)況。
以下是戴大使準(zhǔn)備發(fā)表的講話：

Hello, everyone.  Thank you for being here.  I want to thank John Hamre, Bill Reinsch, and the Center for Strategic & International Studies for hosting me today.  CSIS plays a vital role in our foreign policy discourse.  It is fitting that I am here speaking to you about one of the most important global issues.
大家好。謝謝你們的到來。我要感謝約翰 · 哈姆雷、比爾 · 萊因施和戰(zhàn)略與國際研究中心今天接待我。CSIS 在我們的外交政策討論中扮演著重要的角色。我在這里就最重要的全球問題之一向大家發(fā)表講話是很合適的。

I have said this before and I will continue to say it: the U.S.-China trade and economic relationship is one of profound consequence.  As the two largest economies in the world, how we relate to each other does not just affect our two countries. It impacts the entire world and billions of workers.
我以前曾經(jīng)說過，我將繼續(xù)說: 美中貿(mào)易和經(jīng)濟(jì)關(guān)系是一個深遠(yuǎn)的影響。作為世界上最大的兩個經(jīng)濟(jì)體，我們彼此之間的關(guān)系不僅影響到我們兩國。它影響了整個世界和數(shù)十億工人。

This bilateral relationship is complex and competitive.  President Biden welcomes that competition to support American workers, grow our economy, and create jobs at home.  
這種雙邊關(guān)系是復(fù)雜和競爭性的。 拜登總統(tǒng)歡迎這種競爭，以支持美國工人，發(fā)展我們的經(jīng)濟(jì)，并在國內(nèi)創(chuàng)造就業(yè)機(jī)會。

He believes we need to manage the competition responsibly – and ensure that it is fair.  
他認(rèn)為，我們需要負(fù)責(zé)任地管理這種競爭--并確保它是公平的。

For too long, China’s lack of adherence to global trading norms has undercut the prosperity of Americans and others around the world.  
長期以來，中國不遵守全球貿(mào)易規(guī)范，削弱了美國人和世界各地其他人的繁榮。

In recent years, Beijing has doubled down on its state-centered economic system.  It is increasingly clear that China’s plans do not include meaningful reforms to address the concerns that have been shared by the United States and many other countries.  
近年來，中國政府加倍堅持以國家為中心的經(jīng)濟(jì)體制。越來越清楚的是，中國的計劃并沒有包括有意義的改革，以解決美國和其他許多國家共同關(guān)心的問題。

We have a lot of work to do.
我們有很多工作要做。

To be successful, we must be direct and honest about the challenges we face and the grave risk from leaving them unaddressed.  We must explore all options to chart the most effective path forward.
為了取得成功，我們必須直接和誠實(shí)地面對我們面臨的挑戰(zhàn)，以及不解決這些挑戰(zhàn)所帶來的嚴(yán)重風(fēng)險。我們必須探索所有選擇，以規(guī)劃最有效的前進(jìn)道路。

When it comes to our relationship with China, what’s best for American workers is growing the American economy to create more opportunity and more jobs with better wages here in the United States.  
當(dāng)涉及到我們與中國的關(guān)系時，對美國工人來說最好的就是發(fā)展美國經(jīng)濟(jì)，在美國創(chuàng)造更多的機(jī)會和更好的工資。

As the United States Trade Representative, I intend to deliver on President Biden’s vision for a worker-centered trade policy in the U.S.-China trade dynamic.  We need to show that trade policy can be a force for good in the lives of everyday people.  
作為美國貿(mào)易代表，我打算在美中貿(mào)易動態(tài)中實(shí)現(xiàn)拜登總統(tǒng)提出的以工人為中心的貿(mào)易政策愿景。我們需要表明，貿(mào)易政策可以成為普通民眾生活中的一股造福力量。

We will create durable trade policy that benefits a broad range of stakeholders by rebuilding trust with our workers and aligning our domestic and foreign policies.
我們將通過與我們的工人重建信任，并使我們的國內(nèi)和國外政策保持一致，創(chuàng)造出有利于廣泛的利益相關(guān)者的持久貿(mào)易政策。

President Biden has been clear: the key to our global competitiveness and creating shared prosperity begins at home.  We have to make smart domestic investments to increase our own competitiveness.  We must invest in research and development and clean energy technology, strengthen our manufacturing base, and incentivize companies to Buy American up and down the supply chain.
拜登總統(tǒng)已經(jīng)說得很清楚: 我們?nèi)蚋偁幜蛣?chuàng)造共同繁榮的關(guān)鍵始于國內(nèi)。我們必須作出明智的國內(nèi)投資，以提高我們自己的競爭力。我們必須投資于研發(fā)和清潔能源技術(shù)，加強(qiáng)我們的制造業(yè)基礎(chǔ)，并鼓勵企業(yè)在整個供應(yīng)鏈中購買美國產(chǎn)品。

We already accomplished some of that work with the American Rescue Plan, the Administration’s focus on supply chain resilience, and our investments in our technological leadership.  The Administration is working closely with Congress to build on those actions with the Bipartisan Infrastructure Deal and the Build Back Better agenda.
我們已經(jīng)通過美國救援計劃、政府對供應(yīng)鏈彈性的關(guān)注，以及我們對技術(shù)領(lǐng)先地位的投資，完成了其中一些工作。政府正在與國會密切合作，通過兩黨基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施協(xié)議和重建更好的議程，在這些行動的基礎(chǔ)上再接再厲。

In terms of U.S.-China trade, in recent months, the Biden-Harris Administration has conducted a comprehensive review.
在美中貿(mào)易方面，最近幾個月，拜登-哈里斯政府進(jìn)行了一次全面審查。

And today, I will lay out the starting point of our Administration’s strategic vision for realigning our trade policies towards China to defend the interests of America’s workers, businesses, farmers and producers, and strengthen our middle class.  
今天，我將列出我們政府戰(zhàn)略愿景的出發(fā)點(diǎn)，重新調(diào)整我們對華貿(mào)易政策，以維護(hù)美國工人、企業(yè)、農(nóng)民和生產(chǎn)者的利益，并加強(qiáng)我們的中產(chǎn)階級。

First, we will discuss with China its performance under the Phase One Agreement.  China made commitments that benefit certain American industries, including agriculture, that we must enforce.  
首先，我們將與中國討論其在《第一階段協(xié)議》下的表現(xiàn)。 中國做出了有利于包括農(nóng)業(yè)在內(nèi)的某些美國產(chǎn)業(yè)的承諾，我們必須執(zhí)行這些承諾。

President Biden will continue to promote our economic interests – and build confidence for American industry.
拜登總統(tǒng)將繼續(xù)促進(jìn)我們的經(jīng)濟(jì)利益，并為美國工業(yè)建立信心。

Second, we will start a targeted tariff exclusion process.  We will ensure that the existing enforcement structure optimally serves our economic interests.  We will keep open the potential for additional exclusion processes, as warranted.
第二，我們將啟動有針對性的關(guān)稅排除程序。我們會確?，F(xiàn)行的執(zhí)法架構(gòu)能以最佳方式符合香港的經(jīng)濟(jì)利益。我們將保持開放的潛力，額外的排除過程，如果需要的話。

Third, we continue to have serious concerns with China’s state-centered and non-market trade practices that were not addressed in the Phase One deal.  As we work to enforce the terms of Phase One, we will raise these broader policy concerns with Beijing.  
第三，我們繼續(xù)嚴(yán)重關(guān)切中國以國家為中心的非市場貿(mào)易做法，這些做法在第一階段的交易中沒有得到解決。在我們努力執(zhí)行第一階段的條款時，我們將向北京方面提出這些更廣泛的政策關(guān)切。

And we will use the full range of tools we have and develop new tools as needed to defend American economic interests from harmful policies and practices.
我們將利用我們所擁有的全部工具，開發(fā)新的工具，以保護(hù)美國的經(jīng)濟(jì)利益免受有害政策和做法的影響。

Finally and critically, we will continue to work with allies to shape the rules for fair trade in the 21st century, and facilitate a race to the top for market economies and democracies.
最后，關(guān)鍵的是，我們將繼續(xù)與盟友合作，為21世紀(jì)的公平貿(mào)易制定規(guī)則，并促進(jìn)市場經(jīng)濟(jì)和民主國家的競爭。

Before I get into further details around our plans, I would like to reflect on how the U.S.-China trade relationship has evolved in recent decades – and how we got to where we are today.
在進(jìn)一步討論我們計劃的細(xì)節(jié)之前，我想先回顧一下近幾十年來美中貿(mào)易關(guān)系的發(fā)展，以及我們是如何走到今天這一步的。

From the late 1970s to mid-1980s, China went from the world’s eleventh-largest economy to the eighth-largest.  U.S. exports to China increased approximately four-fold, while imports grew 14 times in less than 1 0 years.  
從上世紀(jì)70年代末到80年代中期，中國從世界第11大經(jīng)濟(jì)體躍居第8大經(jīng)濟(jì)體。在不到10年的時間里，美國對中國的出口增長了大約4倍，而進(jìn)口增長了14倍。

This economic growth set the stage for China’s efforts to join the WTO.   
這種經(jīng)濟(jì)增長為中國加入世貿(mào)組織奠定了基礎(chǔ)。

The world faced an important challenge at that time: how to integrate a state-led economy into a trade institution created by those dedicated to open, market-oriented principles.
當(dāng)時，世界面臨著一個重大挑戰(zhàn): 如何將國家主導(dǎo)的經(jīng)濟(jì)納入由致力于開放、面向市場原則的人創(chuàng)建的貿(mào)易機(jī)構(gòu)。

In grappling with this dilemma, some believed there would be huge boosts in industrial and agricultural exports to China and its growing middle class.  Others argued that accelerated and massive job losses would result.
為了應(yīng)對這一困境，一些人認(rèn)為，對中國及其不斷壯大的中產(chǎn)階級的工業(yè)和農(nóng)業(yè)出口將會大幅增長。其他人則認(rèn)為會加速和大規(guī)模的失業(yè)。

In the end, China officially joined the WTO in December 2001.
最后，中國于2001年12月正式加入世貿(mào)組織。

Over the next decade and a half, the United States pursued a dual-track approach with Beijing.
在接下來的15年里，美國采取了與北京的雙軌辦法。

One track involved annual high-level dialogues between U.S. and Chinese officials over three successive presidential administrations.  These talks were intended to push China towards complying with and internalizing WTO rules and norms, and making other market-oriented changes.  
其中一個軌道涉及美國和中國官員連續(xù)三屆總統(tǒng)任期內(nèi)的年度高級別對話。這些會談的目的是推動中國遵守和內(nèi)化世貿(mào)組織的規(guī)則和規(guī)范，并作出其他面向市場的改變。

But those commitments became more difficult to secure over the years, and China’s follow-through was inconsistent and impossible to enforce.
但這些年來，這些承諾變得更加難以兌現(xiàn)，中國的后續(xù)行動也不一致，無法實(shí)施。

The other track focused on dispute settlement cases at the WTO.  We brought 27 cases against China, including some I litigated myself, and through collaboration with our allies.  We secured victories in every case that was decided.  Still, even when China changed the specific practices we challenged, it did not change the underlying policies, and meaningful reforms by China remained elusive.  
另一條軌道側(cè)重于世貿(mào)組織的爭端解決案件。我們對中國提起了27起訴訟，其中包括我自己提起的一些訴訟，并通過與我們的盟友合作。我們在每一個已經(jīng)決定的案件中都取得了勝利。盡管如此，即使中國改變了我們所挑戰(zhàn)的具體做法，它也沒有改變基本政策，中國的有意義的改革仍然難以實(shí)現(xiàn)。

In recent years, China’s leaders have doubled-down on their state-centric economic model.
近年來，中國領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人加倍堅持以國家為中心的經(jīng)濟(jì)模式。

Faced with the reality that neither the dialogue nor the enforcement tracks were producing meaningful changes, the previous administration decided to use a different paradigm – unilateral U.S. pressure – to try to change Beijing’s practices.
面對現(xiàn)實(shí)，無論是對話還是執(zhí)行軌道都沒有產(chǎn)生有意義的變化，上屆政府決定采用另一種模式——美國單方面施壓——試圖改變北京的做法。

It launched an investigation focused on China’s forced IP and technology transfer policies – longstanding and serious problems.  This led to substantial U.S. tariffs on imports from China – and retaliation by China.  Against this backdrop of rising tensions, in January 2020, the previous administration and China agreed to what is commonly referred to as the “Phase One Agreement.”  
它發(fā)起了一項針對中國強(qiáng)制性知識產(chǎn)權(quán)和技術(shù)轉(zhuǎn)讓政策的調(diào)查——這是長期存在的嚴(yán)重問題。這導(dǎo)致美國對從中國進(jìn)口的商品征收高額關(guān)稅，中國也進(jìn)行了報復(fù)。在緊張局勢不斷升級的背景下，2020年1月，上屆政府與中國達(dá)成了通常所說的“第一階段協(xié)議”

This agreement includes a limited set of commitments.  These cover China’s obligations regarding intellectual property and technology transfer, purchases of American products, and improved market access for the agriculture and financial services sectors.  
這項協(xié)議包括一系列有限的承諾。這包括中國在知識產(chǎn)權(quán)和技術(shù)轉(zhuǎn)讓、購買美國產(chǎn)品以及改善農(nóng)業(yè)和金融服務(wù)部門的市場準(zhǔn)入方面的義務(wù)。

It has stabilized the market, especially for U.S. agricultural exports. But our analysis indicates that while commitments in certain areas have been met, and certain business interests have seen benefits, there have been shortfalls in others.
它穩(wěn)定了市場，尤其是美國的農(nóng)產(chǎn)品出口。但我們的分析表明，雖然某些領(lǐng)域的承諾已經(jīng)兌現(xiàn)，某些商業(yè)利益已經(jīng)受益，但在其他領(lǐng)域卻存在不足。

But the reality is, this agreement did not meaningfully address the fundamental concerns that we have with China’s trade practices and their harmful impacts on the U.S. economy.
但現(xiàn)實(shí)是，這項協(xié)議并沒有有意義地解決我們對中國貿(mào)易行為及其對美國經(jīng)濟(jì)的有害影響的根本關(guān)切。

Even with the Phase One Agreement in place, China’s government continues to pour billions of dollars into targeted industries and continues to shape its economy to the will of the state – hurting the interests of workers here in the U.S and around the world.  
即使簽訂了第一階段協(xié)議，中國政府仍繼續(xù)向目標(biāo)產(chǎn)業(yè)投入數(shù)十億美元，并繼續(xù)按照國家意愿塑造其經(jīng)濟(jì)——這損害了美國和世界各地工人的利益。

Let’s look at the steel industry.  In 2000, there were more than 100 U.S. steel companies.  We produced 100 million metric tons of steel annually and the industry employed 136,000 people in communities across the country.
讓我們來看看鋼鐵行業(yè)。2000年，美國有100多家鋼鐵公司。我們每年生產(chǎn)1億公噸鋼材，這個行業(yè)在全國各地的社區(qū)雇傭了13.6萬人。

Soon after, China started building its own steel plants.  Its production capacity ballooned, depriving U.S. steel companies of valuable market opportunities.  Low priced Chinese steel flooded the global market, driving out businesses in the United States and around the world.  
不久之后，中國開始建造自己的鋼鐵廠。它的生產(chǎn)能力激增，剝奪了美國鋼鐵公司寶貴的市場機(jī)會。低價的中國鋼鐵充斥著全球市場，將美國和世界各地的企業(yè)擠出了市場。

Every steel plant that shuttered left hundreds of workers without livelihoods.  It also left communities reeling, as small businesses dependent on plants also closed their doors and blighted buildings brought down real estate values.
每一家關(guān)閉的鋼鐵廠都讓數(shù)百名工人失去了生計。由于依賴核電站的小企業(yè)也關(guān)門大吉，破敗的建筑物降低了房地產(chǎn)價值，這也使得社區(qū)陷入混亂。

Today, China produces over one billion metric tons annually – and accounts for nearly 60 percent of global steel production.  China produces more steel in a single month than the United States and most other countries in the world produce in an entire year.  In the U.S., employment in the steel industry has dropped 40 percent since 2000.  
如今，中國每年生產(chǎn)超過10億噸鋼鐵，占全球鋼鐵產(chǎn)量的近60% 。中國一個月的鋼鐵產(chǎn)量超過了美國和世界上大多數(shù)其他國家一整年的產(chǎn)量。在美國，鋼鐵行業(yè)的就業(yè)人數(shù)自2000年以來下降了40% 。

We see the impact of China’s unfair policies in the production of photovoltaic solar cells.  The United States was once a global leader in what was then an emerging industry.  But as China built out its own industry, our companies were forced to close their doors.  
我們看到了中國在光伏太陽能電池生產(chǎn)方面不公平政策的影響。美國曾經(jīng)是一個新興產(chǎn)業(yè)的全球領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者。但隨著中國建立起自己的產(chǎn)業(yè)，我們的公司被迫關(guān)門大吉。

Today, China represents 80 percent of global production – and large parts of the solar supply chain don’t even exist in the United States.
今天，中國占全球產(chǎn)量的80% ，而太陽能供應(yīng)鏈的很大一部分甚至不存在于美國。

U.S. agriculture has not been spared either.  While we have seen more exports to China in recent years, market share is shrinking and agriculture remains an unpredictable sector for U.S. farmers and ranchers who have come to rely heavily on this market.  China’s regulatory authorities continue to deploy measures that limit or threaten the market access for our producers – and their bottom line.  
美國農(nóng)業(yè)也未能幸免。雖然近年來我們看到對中國的出口有所增加，但市場份額正在萎縮，對于嚴(yán)重依賴中國市場的美國農(nóng)場主和牧場主來說，農(nóng)業(yè)仍然是一個不可預(yù)測的領(lǐng)域。中國監(jiān)管當(dāng)局繼續(xù)采取措施，限制或威脅我們生產(chǎn)商的市場準(zhǔn)入，以及他們的利潤。

We also see troubling dynamics playing out today with the semiconductor industry.  In 2014, China issued an industrial plan to announce “the goal of establishing a world-leading semiconductor industry…by 2030.”  Reportedly, China has already spent at least $150 billion on this effort, with more on the way.  Its intentions are clear, just as they were with steel and solar.  
今天，我們也看到了美國半導(dǎo)體產(chǎn)業(yè)的麻煩動態(tài)。2014年，中國發(fā)布了一項產(chǎn)業(yè)計劃，宣布了“到2030年建立世界領(lǐng)先的中國半導(dǎo)體產(chǎn)業(yè)的目標(biāo)”據(jù)報道，中國已經(jīng)在這方面投入了至少1500億美元，還有更多的投入正在進(jìn)行中。它的意圖是明確的，就像他們對待鋼鐵和太陽能一樣。

Those policies have reinforced a zero-sum dynamic in the world economy where China’s growth and prosperity come at the expense of workers and economic opportunity here in the U.S. and other market-based, democratic economies.   
這些政策加強(qiáng)了世界經(jīng)濟(jì)中的零和動態(tài)，中國的增長和繁榮是以犧牲美國和其他以市場為基礎(chǔ)的民主經(jīng)濟(jì)體的工人和經(jīng)濟(jì)機(jī)會為代價的。

That is why we need to take a new, holistic, and pragmatic approach in our relationship with China that can actually further our strategic and economic objectives – for the near-term and the long-term.  
這就是為什么我們需要在我們與中國的關(guān)系中采取一種新的、整體的和務(wù)實(shí)的方法，這實(shí)際上可以促進(jìn)我們的戰(zhàn)略和經(jīng)濟(jì)目標(biāo)——無論是近期的還是長期的。

As our economic relationship with China evolves, so too must our tactics to defend our interests.  As the years go by, the stakes keep getting higher and boosting American competitiveness becomes all the more important.  
隨著我們與中國經(jīng)濟(jì)關(guān)系的發(fā)展，我們捍衛(wèi)自身利益的策略也必須發(fā)展。隨著時間的推移，風(fēng)險越來越高，提高美國的競爭力變得越來越重要。

Our strategy must address these concerns, while also being flexible and agile to confront future challenges from China that may arise.
我們的戰(zhàn)略必須解決這些問題，同時也要靈活和敏捷地應(yīng)對來自中國的未來可能出現(xiàn)的挑戰(zhàn)。

So how do we accomplish this?
那么，我們?nèi)绾螌?shí)現(xiàn)這一目標(biāo)呢？

Unlike the past, this administration will engage from a position of strength because we are investing in our workers and our infrastructure.
與過去不同的是，本屆政府將從實(shí)力的角度參與，因為我們正在對我們的工人和基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施進(jìn)行投資。

Repairing our roads and bridges, modernizing our ports, and delivering expanded broadband are the kinds of investments that will begin to give American workers and businesses the boost needed to embrace their global competitiveness.  
修復(fù)我們的道路和橋梁，使我們的港口現(xiàn)代化，以及提供擴(kuò)大的寬帶，這些投資將開始給美國的工人和企業(yè)帶來擁抱他們的全球競爭力所需的推動力。

And we must harness and leverage the talent of our people by investing in education and worker training – investments that are included in the President’s Build Back Better plan. We also need to re-double our own efforts to be the most innovative country in the world by researching, developing, and creating new and emerging technology.
我們必須通過投資教育和工人培訓(xùn)來利用和發(fā)揮我們?nèi)嗣竦牟拍堋@些投資包括在總統(tǒng)的“重建更好”計劃中。我們還需要加倍努力，通過研究、開發(fā)和創(chuàng)造新興技術(shù)，成為世界上最具創(chuàng)新力的國家。

China and other countries have been investing in their infrastructure for decades.  If we are going to compete in the global market, we need to make equal or greater investments here at home.   
幾十年來，中國和其他國家一直在投資基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施建設(shè)。如果我們要在全球市場上競爭，我們需要在國內(nèi)做出同等或更大的投資。

That continuous investment ensures we can maintain our competitive edge throughout the 21st century.
這種持續(xù)的投資確保了我們能夠在21世紀(jì)保持競爭優(yōu)勢。

Beyond our domestic investments, in the coming days, I intend to have frank conversations with my counterpart in China.
除了我們的國內(nèi)投資，在未來的幾天里，我打算與中國的同行進(jìn)行坦誠的對話。

That will include discussion over China’s performance under the Phase One Agreement.
這將包括討論中國在第一階段協(xié)議下的表現(xiàn)。

And we will also directly engage with China on its industrial policies. Our objective is not to inflame trade tensions with China.
我們還將直接與中國就產(chǎn)業(yè)政策進(jìn)行接觸。我們的目標(biāo)不是加劇與中國的貿(mào)易緊張局勢。

Durable coexistence requires accountability and respect for the enormous consequences of our actions.  I am committed to working through the many challenges ahead in this bilateral process in order to deliver meaningful results.
持久的共存需要對我們行動的巨大后果負(fù)責(zé)和尊重。我致力于應(yīng)對這一雙邊進(jìn)程中的許多挑戰(zhàn)，以取得有意義的成果。

But above all else, we must defend – to the hilt – our economic interests.  
但最重要的是，我們必須竭盡全力捍衛(wèi)我們的經(jīng)濟(jì)利益。

That means taking all steps necessary to protect ourselves against the waves of damage inflicted over the years through unfair competition.  We need to be prepared to deploy all tools and explore the development of new ones, including through collaboration with other economies and countries.  And we must chart a new course to change the trajectory of our bilateral trade dynamic.
這意味著我們要采取一切必要措施，保護(hù)自己免受多年來不公平競爭造成的損害波及。我們需要做好準(zhǔn)備，部署所有工具，探索新工具的開發(fā)，包括通過與其他經(jīng)濟(jì)體和國家的合作。我們必須開辟一條新的道路，改變我們雙邊貿(mào)易活力的軌跡。

And vitally, we will work closely with our allies and like-minded partners towards building truly fair international trade that enables healthy competition.
至關(guān)重要的是，我們將與我們的盟友和志同道合的伙伴密切合作，以建立真正公平的國際貿(mào)易，促進(jìn)健康的競爭。

I have been working to strengthen our alliances through bilateral, regional, and multilateral engagement.  And I will continue to do so.
我一直在努力通過雙邊、區(qū)域和多邊接觸來加強(qiáng)我們的聯(lián)盟。我將繼續(xù)這樣做。

The agreements we reached in June with the EU and the UK to resolve the large civil aircraft disputes at the WTO demonstrate President Biden’s commitment to work with our partners to create a more level playing field for our workers.
今年6月，我們與歐盟和英國達(dá)成協(xié)議，在世貿(mào)組織解決大型民用飛機(jī)糾紛，這表明拜登總統(tǒng)致力于與我們的伙伴合作，為我們的工人創(chuàng)造一個更公平的競爭環(huán)境。

Just last week, I co-chaired the first meeting of the U.S.-E.U. Trade and Technology Council.  As Europe strengthens its own defenses against non-market practices, we will work with them to ensure that our collective policies deliver.
就在上周，我共同主持了美歐貿(mào)易和技術(shù)委員會的第一次會議。隨著歐洲加強(qiáng)自身對非市場行為的防御，我們將與他們合作，確保我們的集體政策發(fā)揮作用。

In the G7, G20, and at the WTO, we are discussing market distortions and other unfair trade practices, such as the use of forced labor in the fisheries sector, and in global supply chains, including in Xinjiang.
在七國集團(tuán)、二十國集團(tuán)和世貿(mào)組織，我們正在討論市場扭曲和其他不公平的貿(mào)易行為，比如在漁業(yè)部門和全球供應(yīng)鏈中使用強(qiáng)制勞動力，包括在新疆。

In the coming months and years, we will build off of this work.
在接下來的幾個月和幾年里，我們將完成這項工作。

Our goal is to bring deliberative, stable, long-term thinking to our approach – and to work through bilateral and multilateral channels.  The core of our strategy is a commitment to ensuring we work with our allies to create fair and open markets.
我們的目標(biāo)是使我們的方法具有審議性、穩(wěn)定性和長期性，并通過雙邊和多邊渠道開展工作。我們戰(zhàn)略的核心是致力于確保我們與我們的盟友一起創(chuàng)造公平和開放的市場。

There is a future in which all of us in the global economy can grow and succeed – where prosperity is inclusive within our own borders and across those borders too.  
在未來，我們?nèi)蚪?jīng)濟(jì)中的所有人都可以實(shí)現(xiàn)增長和成功，繁榮包容我們自己的邊界內(nèi)和跨越這些邊界。

The path we have been on did not take us there.  President Biden’s priorities that I’ve laid out today are aimed at achieving a shared prosperity that is good for our workers, producers, and businesses; good for our allies; and good for the global economy.  
我們走過的路并沒有把我們帶到那里。拜登總統(tǒng)今天闡述的優(yōu)先事項旨在實(shí)現(xiàn)共同繁榮，這對我們的工人、生產(chǎn)者和企業(yè)都有好處，對我們的盟友也有好處，對全球經(jīng)濟(jì)也有好處。

Thank you.
謝謝你。

翻譯僅供參考，詳情請看原文
來源：USTR官網(wǎng)